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Q: In a f ew words,  cou ld you  describe how theClean Development  Mechanism (CDM) , a s  provi -d ed for  in  the  Kyoto  Protoco l,  actua lly work s?
The greenhouse gases that lead to climatic warmingare in the atmosphere, so the effect they have is notrestricted to the states that emit them. This makes
them quite different from more local forms of pollution,
such as water pollution. We are dealing here with the pol-
lution of the global environment, which requires political
solutions at the global level. Although the rich countries are
the main polluters, their existing technology is less polluting
than that available to the developing countries. In India, for
one unit of production, four times the quantity of green-
house gases are emitted on average than in the United
States. Thus, the thinking behind the CDM is that we take
money from the West and give it to the developing world.
European, Canadian or Japanese firms can thus cut the
emission of greenhouse gases, not in their own factories,
but by buying pollution rights in Indian, Bolivian or
Chinese factories while investing in technology projects
designed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The
global effects of atmospheric pollution can thus be reduced
more quickly.
Q: Let ’s  look a t  the  deta ils .  How  do countri esshare thei r  r esponsibi li t ies?
To participate in the Kyoto Protocol, naturally, countries
must ratify the agreement. Most developing countries—
known as “Non-Annex 1 Countries”—have signed up, of
course, including North Korea: it’s in their own interests that
they should receive technological and financial transfers.
Thailand is the only country to have refused, on the grounds
that Kyoto allows rich countries to continue polluting while
buying off the poor countries at negligible cost.
So companies in “rich” countries—known as Annex 1
Countries—may buy polluting rights in the “poor” countries.
This classification is open to criticism. Some countries could
be considered “rich” and yet be listed as Non-Annex 1:
South Korea, for example and, to a lesser extent, China.
As for the rich countries, intergovernmental agreements
impose quotas on greenhouse gas emissions, quotas that are
shared out between the various economic sectors at the
national level. Let’s take as an example a French company
that has to reduce its gas emissions. It has three options: cut
down its volume of production, introduce new technology or
seek out a firm in a developing country—a Non-Annex 1
country signed up to Kyoto. The reduction is estimated then
certified by the Executive Board of the CDM (2). This cer-
tificate can in due course be presented by the company in
the industrialised country as justification for not having
reduced its own emissions.
Q: Can  you g iv e us  some concre te examples  o fpro je cts  that  you are  working  on  wi th enterpr ise sin deve loping countri es?
Let’s take the typical case of a sugar refinery we’re working
with. At the end of the production process there remains a
37% residue of sugar cane waste, which is used as a fertiliss-
er, dumped or burned. In all three cases, the CO2 contained
within this residue is released into the atmosphere. This is
where we come in, to arrange for a furnace to be built, one
that will burn the residue and generate electricity for the
sugar refinery. There’ll even be an energy surplus that the
refinery can sell. The reduction in greenhouse gases is meas-
ured by the difference between the energy consumed before
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1. Carbon Management Consulting is active in setting up projects as envisaged in the
Clean Development Mechanism provided for in the Kyoto Protocol.
2. Itself subject to the authority of the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
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the furnace is installed and that consumed after the new
technology is introduced. It’s the same story with a paper
mill where, as often happens in developing countries, the
wood waste is dumped.
Further examples are cement works and steel-making plants:
with their blast furnaces, they consume large amounts of
energy in producing high temperatures, around 1,200°C.
Instead of allowing this heat to escape, European and
American furnaces have for a long time been diverting it for
use in generating energy. The CDM is encouraging the use
of these technologies in cement works and steel plants in
developing countries, so as to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
In the transport field, we are at present working with a co-
operative of 3,000 trawler operators, modifying their
engines; also with the municipal authorities in a Russian city
to replace their bus engines.
Q:  When an ente rpr ise  wi shes  to  mount  a  projectwi th in  the  CDM proc ess,  what  steps  must  i t  taketo have  it  regis tered?
The Kyoto agreements on the CDM open up the possibili-
ty for enormous transfers of technological and financial
resources from rich countries to developing countries. So
very strict rules have been applied governing the validation
of projects. The company submits a five-page preliminary
report on the feasibility of the project. Only 22% of projects
graduate to the second stage: here the long and costly
administrative task begins, aimed at providing proof that the
project is viable. Only 4% of projects will finally be
approved by the Executive Board of the CDM and imple-
mented.
This registration process is based on two main principles.
The first comes down to two requirements. One is that any
project for technological improvement that might be finan-
cially viable without receiving subsidies under the CDM, as
laid down by the Kyoto agreements, is not eligible. That
means, in effect, that developing countries would be in a
position economically to finance it by themselves. So in this
case the CDM would, at the economic level, be unneces-
sary. The second requirement is that the project must be
equally viable from the economic and the social points of
view. For example, modernising modernising the air condi-
tioning system in a factory using HFCs (3) is financed over
two years. Many such projects are approved. On the other
hand, when it comes to building a dam, it would take twen-
ty years to pay off the project if it were financed exclusively
by Kyoto subsidies. It would take only a slight modification
of the project’s parameters for it no longer to be profitable.
Moreover, with such huge projects, social effects, such as
the transfer of population or deforestation, are also taken
into account. So this first principle leaves a very narrow lee-
waymargin for manoeuvre in validating projects. 
The second principle derives from the absence of any pre-
cise automatic approach tomethodology for registration. The
Executive Board of the CDM tells us: “Come to us with
your projects; draw your inspiration from the methodology of
a project that has already been accepted; or else propose a
new method.” Today there are 35 listed methodologies that
can be used for reference. But, if a new method is deemed
better, it replaces the preceding one. The registration proce-
dure lasts several months and any projects half-way through
a validation based upon the old methodology must now start
all over again. Unfortunately, this moving of the goal posts
as one approaches them is frustrating; it is expensive; and it
sometimes damages the CDM’s credibility.
Q:  How signif icant  i s  China in te rms  of  CDMprojects  and what  kinds o f  p roje cts  ar e imple-mented?
China would like to finance more dams, more mammoth
projects, within the CDM. To give you some idea, the proj-
ects we generally handle might yield emission reductions of
around 80,000 tons a year. In China we are looking for
reductions of around one and a half million tons! As a result,
that country represents more than a third of the financial
transfers in CDM projects at the present time, but only 10%
of the projects registered. Nevertheless, China is under the
eye of the United Nations, which is not too happy about the
ill effects, in social and environmental terms, of giant dams.
Q: In the circumstances  you have outlined—fewprojects  winning registration and the rapid growthof the Chinese economy based on industries emit-ting high levels  of  greenhouse gases—one mightask whether the CDM, as  defined in the Kyotoagreement,  adds up to anything more than a dropin the ocean where China is concerned?
Indeed, it is difficult to rely wholly on the CDM, the more
so when the road to margin for manoeuvre in validation hav-
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3. Hydrofluorocarbons, one of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: it
is used in industrial refrigeration processes. 
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ing projects validated is so narrow, and when the odds
against any single project are so high. However, I consider
that, right now, this is the best mechanism we have. The
Kyoto Protocol is not enough, that’s true, but we must go
forward. Even if it’s not perfect, we are all the same reduc-
ing the emissions of greenhouse gases. Some people think
that the rich countries would do better to hand out cheques
to the governments of developing countries so that they
could finance fiscal measures favouuring the adoption of
technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Personally,
I place greater confidence in the market created through the
CDM, and in the UN regulators of the Executive Board of
the CDM, which cannot easily be corrupted. Moreover, the
CDM enables the two categories of enterprises to see their
advantages in concrete terms. Most importantly, one can
maintain very strict control, on the ground, in the enterprise,
of the improvement in cutting greenhouse gas emissions. On
the other hand, for enterprises that have a good project but
that don’t fit easily into the CDM criteria laid down by the
Kyoto Protocol, it does seem more and more necessary to
create parallel financial products similar to those existing on
other financial markets. In this way these projects could be
financed and the risks associated with this kind of operation
could be limited. Markets of this kind are going to become
enormous and positions need to be taken without delay.
Q: From a  fi scal  po int  of  view, is  it  possible  tomove  towards measures  that wil l  encourage en-te rpr is es  in “poor”  countri es  to  introduce  sustai -nable deve lopment?
Indeed, we must achieve a system whereby industry in the
developing countries will invest in less polluting technology.
But fiscal incentives are expensive; and many developing
countries cannot afford to reward their taxpayers for cleaning
up their act. Nowadays, countries are asked to make that
effort very early in the development process. An example is
South Korea, which has the means to offer fiscal incentives of
this kind, whereas China does not. The multitude of Chinese
SMEs might respond to fiscal incentives, but it is difficult to
push them into costly imports of natural gas when they can
consume domestically-produced coal, which is cheaper.
So for the present, the only incentives are exogenous,
through the CDM provided for in the Kyoto Protocol. In
order that a German or French company can continue pro-
ducing more carbon emissions, it will pass financial
resources to an enterprise in a developing country, enabling
it to adopt technology emitting less greenhouse gases.
Furthermore, it’s true that from the fiscal point of view,
Beijing does not really play the game. The Chinese govern-
ment, right from the launch of the CMD projects in China,
announced the imposition of a special tax on Kyoto projects,
at a far higher rate than other developing countries set for
them. For example, on projects for reducing HFCs (4), the
special tax is set at 65% of the total amount of Kyoto subsi-
dies. This tax sharply reduces the incentive for Chinese
enterprises. Moreover, China complains that it does not
earn enough from Kyoto transfers, arguing that the prices for
polluting rights (that is to say, per ton of CO2) are not high
enough. In fact, it may be that both government and indus-
try in China are wondering why they should rush into tech-
nological change now, when the price for a ton of CO2 will
be 50 Euros in five years, as against 7 Euros today. China
is gambling on the fact that developing countries will bene-
fit far more from Kyoto 2.
Q: Part  o f  the debate  over  globa l warming i s  no-wadays focused  on  re sponsibil ity per  capita.  Onthe othe r hand, when  the  emiss ion  of  g reenhousegases  i s  cons ider ed in  absolute te rms , seve ral  ex -per t  studies  indica te  that  China  is  go ing to  over -take the US very soon, p erhaps  even by the endof th is  year.  In  the  inter ests  of  a world w ithoutfrontie rs ,  should we not  now  abandon ca lcu la-tions-based emissions pe r head, which rankChina far  behind the more  developed countri esand allow  it  to  avoid any  future r espons ibi li ti esin the batt le  against  c limate change?
China’s answer is that the industrialised countries are respon-
sible for the present state of global warming and should now
pay the price for their advanced status by helping the devel-
oping countries. I agree with that. Political negotiations can-
not stop China industrialising. The rich countries will have to
accept parting with some of their wealth to finance develop-
ment in the poor countries with technology that’s more effi-
cient in restricting greenhouse gas emissions.
Q: Given  its  s ize  and the  impac t of  its  e conomicdeve lopment,  which extends far  beyond i ts  fron-ti er s,  should China  of  its  own  ac cord not  contri -bute ,  as  a matter  of  publi c  po li cy,  to r ef in ing  i tsmode l o f  e conomic g rowth,  which  at  p re sent isdismissive of  environmental concerns?
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I hear what you’re saying. On the ecological front, China
will come up against near-physical obstacles to its develop-
ment. The growth of energy consumption in China and
India over the years ahead will inevitably cause pollution
and threaten all the advances made through the Kyoto
Protocol. We know that CO2 emissions are drastically
reduced with the transition of industrial structures towards
the services. But many years must pass before China, the
world’s vast factory floor, reaches the third (knowledge-
based) stage in economic development. One cannot com-
pare present-day China to the South Korea of twenty years
ago. Admittedly, part of the population is seeing improve-
ments in its living standards, rising levels of consumption and
the accumulation of savings, but that still only affects the
minority. The relative poverty of a large part of the popula-
tion creates the tendency for people to favouur short-term
enrichment at the cost of long-term problems. For a relative-
ly long period ahead, the structure of the labouur market,
combined with demographic and educational problems will
keep China’s growth heavily dependent on industry. What is
more, the pressure that the Chinese people can exert on
their government over environmental problems is still very
limited. 
Q:  What  do you  judge to  be  the  most  impor tantre forms to  implement  fo r  the post -2012 per iod:I’m thinking  pa rt icu la rly  of  large countri es  suchas China and  India?
We should certainly reduce the stringency of the registration
requirements for projects within the CDM. There is the
issue of the price per ton of CO2 and the related issue of
emission quotas: both are essential. All serious multination-
als in the rich countries are setting funds aside for whatever
they’ll have to pay in order to continue production, but with-
out having any idea what the CO2 cost will be. We’re trying
to intervene in this matter: it is our job to attempt to offer
companies some certainty as to the price of polluting rights
by establishing new financial procedures in the marketplace.
This question of quotas, as our European experience shows
us, strongly influences the cost of CO2. That’s the biggest
headache for everyone working now on Kyoto 2.
On top of the question of quotas, Kyoto 2 will have to
rethink the two categories of country, that is to say, those
that pay and those that receive. The US will certainly have
to come back into Kyoto 2 because, politically, no one can
be seen not to do so. Some countries (Non-Annex 1) that
are today receiving subsidies from the rich countries should
perhaps be excluded from that category. At the same time,
to solve the problem of the Newly Industrialised Countries,
including China and India, one might envisage a third cate-
gory of country to be negotiated under Kyoto 2. Countries
in this category would receive no further subsidies but, to
make up for that, their obligations in terms of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions would be limited. Another transi-
tional expedient might be for them to receive less in subsi-
dies than the poorer countries, so that they would not
monopolise so large a proportion of the CDM transfers. •
• Translated from the French by Philip Liddell
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